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Several empirical studies in the literature have documented the
existence of a positive correlation between income inequalitiy and un-
employment. I provide a theoretical framework under which this cor-
relation can be better understood. The analysis is based on a dynamic
job search under uncertainty. I start by proving the uniqueness of a
stationary distribution of wages in the economy. Drawing upon this
distribution, I provide a general expression for the Gini coe¢ cient of
income inequality. The expression has the advantage of not requiring
a particular speci￿cation of the distribution of wage o⁄ers. Next, I
show how the Gini coe¢ cient varies as a function of the parameters
of the model, and how it can be expected to be positively correlated
with the rate of unemployment. Two examples are o⁄ered. The ￿rst,
of a technical nature, to show that the convergence of the measures
implied by the underlying Markov process can fail in some cases. The
second, to provide a quantitative assessment of the model and of the
mechanism linking unemployment and inequality.
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11 Introduction
Several empirical studies in the literature have documented the existence of
a positive correlation between income inequality and unemployment.
Nolan (1986) measured the impact of changes in the level of unemploy-
ment on the UK size distribution of annual income using cross-section data
of the Family Expenditure Survey. He documented that unemployment lead
to a shift in the shape of the income distribution, with a rise in the top decile,
the e⁄ect of unemployment on the deterioration of the income distribution
being very signi￿cative. Cardoso (1993) and Cardoso et alli (1995) found
the same positive correlation when studying data of Brazil in the 80s. Using
monthly data for the six largest metropolitan areas, these authors concluded
that inequality responded very clearly to the sharp oscillations in employ-
ment. Quoting one of the main conclusions of the paper: "unemployment
increases inequality". Mirer (1973) arrives at similar conclusions through
simulations of income experiences of the US population under alternative
macroeconomic conditions. Blinder and Esaki (1978) use a time-series ap-
proach and conclude, as well, that changes in the level of unemployment
have a discernible impact on the size distribution of income. Other refer-
ences which have arrived at similar conclusions are Beach (1977) and Budd
and Whiteman (1978).
The literature on income distribution, though, still lacks theoretical for-
malizations able to deliver such a result in a setting in which consumers
maximize utility intertemporally, subject to uncertainty. The purpose of this
paper is ￿lling in this gap.
The basic framework used here is a variation of McCall￿ s (1970) job-search
model. The presentation follows the approach to this model o⁄ered in Stokey
and Lucas (1989). The givens of the model are the distribution of wage o⁄ers,
the probability of layo⁄s (￿) and the probability that a worker does not ￿nd
a job o⁄er next period (￿). Elsewhere [Cysne (2004)] I use the same model
to argue in defense of inequality measures freed from the variations in the
rate of unemployment of the type I investigate here.
I draw on the stationary distribution of wage o⁄ers determined in Cysne
(2004)1 to analyze the correlation between unemployment and inequality.
1Stokey and Lucas (1989, c. 10) ￿nd the stationary distribution for the case in which
￿ = 0: These authors, though, provide no proofs (before taking limits) that the sequence
of measures converge. Cysne (2004) provides a (pathological) example in which this limit
does not exist.
2This is done by: i)using the stationary distribution to provide a general ex-
pression for the Gini coe¢ cient of income inequality2 which does not require
the previous speci￿cation of the distribution of job o⁄ers; ii) showing how
the Gini coe¢ cient varies as a function of the parameters of the model; iii)
showing the channel by means of which the Gini coe¢ cient, as one concludes
from the empirical evidence, can be expected to be positively correlated with
the rate of unemployment and, ￿nally; iv) by providing two examples to
illustrate the method.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model. Sec-
tion 3 is used to obtain the expression for the Gini coe¢ cient of income
inequality as a function of the distribution of wage o⁄ers, the probability of
layo⁄s, and the probability of having job o⁄ers. Section 4 provides a the-
oretical support for the empirical evidence showing the positive correlation
between unemployment and inequality. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
Consider an economy populated by a group of homogenous workers repre-




; B[0;1] denoting the borelians
in [0;1] and L the Lebesgue measure. This economy can be imagined as a
small economy in which all workers are contracted by foreign ￿rms.
For 0 < D < 1; consider also the second measurable space (￿;F;M)
and, in this space, the measure mw induced by the wage-o⁄er function w:




; denote by Fw(t) the
distribution function that (mw￿a:e: -uniquely) determines the measure mw :
Fw(t) = M [w ￿ t]:
The analysis of the job search can be made as a function of just two states
regarding the consumer￿ s optimization problem: call it state ￿ w" and sate
￿ 0": State w corresponds to a job o⁄er of w at hand, and state 0 to no job
o⁄er. In state w the worker can accept or turn down the o⁄er. If he accepts
it, by assumption he stays employed with that wage till he is laid o⁄, which
can happen, in each period, with probability ￿: If he does not accept the
o⁄er or if he gets no o⁄er, he remains in state 0: Being in state zero the only
2I assume throughout the whole paper that the only source of income of each
worker/consumer is the wage income. Transfers and capital income usually represent only
a small fraction of most households￿total income. For the United States, for instance,
following the 1992 SCF (Survey of Consumer Finances), transfers and capital income ac-
count in average for only around 28% of the total income of the households surveyed. This
percentage tends to be even lower in developing countries.
3thing he can do is wait again for a job o⁄er next period, which happens with
probability 1 ￿ ￿: By assumption3:
0 < ￿ < 1 (1)
0 < ￿ < 1
Note that it makes economic sense excluding zero and one of the set in
which theta and alpha takes values.
The individual is not allowed to search while in the job. Going to the job
market again requires ￿rst quitting the job and then waiting for a new o⁄er
next period, which can be easily proved to make this option valueless. The
job o⁄ers are independent and drawn according to the measure mw; which is
supposed to be known by all workers. The worker is not allowed to borrow
or to lend. His consumption, ct; is equal to his income, wt ; in each period.








; 0 < ￿ < 1
As pointed out by Cysne (2004), the solution to this problem is given by
the existence of a reservation wage, above which one accepts the o⁄er, and
below which one turns it down. The reservation wage, ￿ w; which by de￿nition








0 ￿ ￿ w)dFw(w
0) (2)
Cysne (2004) proves the uniqueness and ￿nds the stationary distribution
of wages of the economy. Make fp(s)ds represent the number of people
earning income in the range (s;s + ds): Taking into consideration that all
3It follows from the developments to be made below that having ￿ = 1 would imply
the only ergodic set associated with the transition function de￿ned by the job-search
mechanism to be the set f0g, and the (only) invariant distribution of the associated Markov
process to the degenerated distribution with mass one at this point. I rule out this case
by having ￿ strictly less than one. Regarding theta, since I am allowing the measure of
wage o⁄ers to be of mass one at w = D, having ￿ = 1 in this case would imply a cyclical
behavior of the state, alternating between the points f0g and fDg; which I want to rule
out (see example 1).
4wage o⁄ers in between zero and the reservation wage implies a wage equal to






￿+(1￿￿)mw(A) if s = 0
(1￿￿)dFw(s)
￿+(1￿￿)mw(A) if ￿ w ￿ s < D
(3)
By the law of large numbers, since we are considering a large numbers of
workers drawing from the same distribution, this measure represents the
cross-sectional distribution of wages in the economy.





￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)mw(A)
(4)
where ￿ w follows from (2) and A is the set the lower bound of which is the
reservation wage, and the upper bound of which is D.
3 A General Expression for the Gini Coe¢ -
cient
The Gini coe¢ cient (G) is a ratio between two areas. The ￿rst area is the
one between the the curves k(j) = j and the Lorenz curve L(j); to be de￿ned
below. The second area is the one between the curves k(j) = j and k1(j) = 0:
In all cases; j runs from 0 to 1: By integrating:




The Lorenz curve expresses the fraction of income earned by a fraction of the
population, when this population is ordered from the poorer to the richer.
Given the income density function (3), the fraction of the population earning
















￿+(1￿￿)mw(A) ￿ w ￿ s ￿ D
(6)
















￿+(1￿￿)mw(A) ￿ w ￿ s ￿ D
(7)
The Lorenz curve given by is given by the function Fs(Fp) when s￿ runs from
0 to D.
Note in (6) that if the reservation wage is less than the lower bound of
the distribution Fw; then mw(A) = 1: From (5), it is easy to see that an
increase of the income inequality can be characterized by a decrease of the
area under the Lorenz curve.
The next lines pursue an expression for the Lorenz curve as a function of
fp; which is known. This will allow us to characterize what happens with the
Gini coe¢ cient of income inequality when the parameters ￿ and ￿ change,
given the measure mw:The procedure detailed by Levine and Singer (1970)
can be useful here.
Taking the derivative in (6) and (7) above, one concludes that the slope
of the Lorenz curve is given by s=sA
4, which by integration with respect to
























We are interested in the area under the Lorenz curve between 0 and a






























Finally, by integrating the last double integral by parts:












Proposition 1 If an economy follows the rules described in Section 2, the










(￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ F(￿ w))
R
[ ￿ w;D] udFw(u)
(10)
and the Gini coe¢ cient of income distribution by:








(￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ F(￿ w))
R
[ ￿ w;D] udFw(u)
(11)
Proof. The ￿rst part follows from (3), (4) and (9). The second part
follows from (5).
Proposition 1 allows for a direct calculation of the (short run) income
distribution within a certain group, once the distribution of wage o⁄ers is
known.
4 Unemployment and Inequality
The purpose of this section is analyzing how the Gini coe¢ cient varies as
a function of the givens of the model, and how it relates to the rate of
unemployment.
Below, denote by aL the lower bound of the support of the distribution of
wage o⁄ers, and by Emww the expected value of the distribution characterized
by the measure mw. The reservation wage ￿ w is usually a function of theta
and alpha. In the case in which:
￿
1 + ￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)
Emww < aL (12)
though, that does not happen. where.
Proposition 3, below, establishes the mechanism by means of which one
can better understand the positive correlation between unemployment and
inequality, as documented by the empirical evidences mentioned in the in-
troduction. Under (12), and for small variations of ￿ and ￿, one has:
7Proposition 2 Suppose that an economy is characterized as in Section 2,
and obeys condition (12). Then, regardless of the initial distribution of wage
o⁄ers, the Gini coe¢ cient of income distribution is an increasing function of
the probability of layo⁄ (￿) and an increasing function of the probability that
the worker does not get a job o⁄er (￿): Moreover, since the unemployment
rate ￿
￿+(1￿￿)(1￿F( ￿ w)) is an increasing function of theta and alpha, increases
in anyone of these parameters generate a positive correlation between unem-
ployment and inequality.
Proof. This is a consequence of (11).
Remark 1 When condition does not apply, a qualitative analysis of the prob-
lem shows the following. The y-coordinate of the Lorenz remains at zero till
the population reaches mass ￿
￿+(1￿￿)(1￿F( ￿ w)): Since this is an increasing func-
tion of theta, for the Gini coe¢ cient not to be an increasing function of theta
it is necessary that the Lorenz curve with a lower theta crosses the Lorenz
curve with the higher theta from above (note that the slope of the Lorenz
curve is given by w=wA and wA is a decreasing function of theta). Example
1 below shows that condition (12) is not a necessary condition for the result
of Proposition 1 to be true.
Next, I illustrate the result of Propositions 1 and 2 with an example of
the calculation of the within-group income inequality. First, I calculate the
area under the Lorenz curve by the usual method5. Then I show that one
gets the same answer for the area under the Lorenz curve when (10) is used.
Example 1 Suppose the measure mw is given by the Lebesgue measure in
[0;1]: Note that this measure does not obey condition (12). Using (3):
fp(s) =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
￿
￿+(1￿￿)(1￿ ￿ w); w = 0
0; 0 < s < ￿ w
1￿￿
￿+(1￿￿)(1￿ ￿ w); ￿ w ￿ s
9
> > > > =
> > > > ;
(13)
which leads to the expression for the fraction of the population with income






￿+(1￿￿)(1￿ ￿ w); 0 ￿ s < ￿ w
￿+(s￿ ￿ w)(1￿￿)
￿+(1￿￿)(1￿ ￿ w); ￿ w ￿ s ￿ 1
(14)
5The usual method, when feasible, uses a parameter s to write the fraction of the
population that earns income less or equal than s; does the same regarding the fraction
of total income earned by workers with income less or equal than s; and then proceeds to











0 if 0 ￿ s < ￿ w
(s2￿ ￿ w2)
1￿ ￿ w2 ￿ w ￿ s ￿ 1
(15)
Solve for s in the second term in (14) and substitute into (15) to get the





0; 0 ￿ j < ￿
￿+(1￿￿)(1￿ ￿ w)
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(1￿ ￿ w2) ; ￿
￿+(1￿￿)(1￿ ￿ w) ￿ j ￿ 1
(16)













(1 ￿ ￿ w2)
dj
Making u =
j(￿+(1￿￿)(1￿ ￿ w))+ ￿ w(1￿￿)￿￿




(1 ￿ ￿)(u2 ￿ ￿ w2)




(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ 3￿ w2 + 2￿ w3)
3(1 ￿ ￿ w2)(￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿ w))
(17)
By using (2) and (5), (17) leads to the closed-form solution to the Gini
coe¢ cient. To compare this expression with the one given by (10), and show
that both expressions deliver the same result, note that, in this case, in (10),













1 ￿ 3￿ w2 + 2￿ w3
6
from which (17) follows trivially.
Let￿ s proceed to ￿nd the Gini coe¢ cient in this case, as a function of both
theta and alpha. Using (17), the only thing we have to do is calculating the
reservation wage as a function of both alpha and theta. From (2) we get:
￿ w(￿;￿) =





1 ￿ ￿￿ + ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿
)2 ￿ 1 (18)
9The ￿nal expression for the Gini coe¢ cient as a function of the parame-
ters theta and alpha can be obtained by substituting (18) in (17) and using
(5). Figure 1 and 2 present the Gini coe¢ cient, for ￿ = 0:98; when theta and
alpha are allowed to vary in (0;1): Note that, in this case, the Gini coe¢ cient
is an increasing function of both theta and alpha, a concave function of theta,
and a convex function of alpha. Note also that the rate of unemployment of
this group of workers is given by ￿
￿+(1￿￿)(1￿ ￿ w) , which is an increasing function
of both theta and alpha.
When alpha is very close to one (but not one), the Gini is very close to
one as well, because a very small percentage of the population happens to get
job o⁄ers. All the remaining workers have no o⁄ers and a wage equal to
zero. Having theta close to one, though, does not imply a Gini coe¢ cient
tending towards one. The reason is that, even when theta is equal to one,
those workers who were not employed last period are allowed (with probability
1 ￿ ￿) to get job o⁄ers and, possibly, to accept them.
5 Conclusions
The empirical evidence shows that the income inequality increases when un-
employment increases. This link, though, still lacks theoretical formaliza-
tions of a dynamic and stochastic nature, by means of which it can be better
understood. In this paper have tried to add to the understanding of this
problem.
The analysis was based on a job-search model characterized by a unique
invariant distribution of wages in the economy. Under this setting, I have
derived an expression which allows for the (invariant-distribution) calculation
of the Gini coe¢ cient of income inequality under any initial distribution of
wage o⁄ers. Next, I have drawn on this measure to study how inequality
varied with the parameters of the model, and with the rate of unemployment.
Two examples have been o⁄ered in the paper. The ￿rst, actually a coun-
terexample, to show that the convergence of the measures de￿ned by the
Markov process implicit in the problem is not trivial. The second, to il-
lustrate, the connection between inequality, the probability of layo⁄, and
the probability of ￿nding a job o⁄er. Since an increase in anyone of these
parameters leads to an increase in the rate of unemployment, the example
also allows for a quantitative assessment of the positive correlation between
inequality and unemployment.
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